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Most ﬂuctuations in stock prices, real estate values, and other asset prices
pose no particular challenge to central banks, as they are just some of the
usual factors inﬂuencing the outlook for real activity and inﬂation. But
many argue that pronounced booms and busts in asset markets are another
matter, especially if actual valuations appear to be misaligned with funda-
mentals. What should a central bank do when it suspects it faces a major
speculative event—one that might be large enough to threaten economic
stability when it unwinds? To help frame the discussion, I will focus on 
two diﬀerent strategies that have been proposed for dealing with market
bubbles.1
The ﬁrst approach—which I will label the conventional strategy—calls
for central banks to focus exclusively on the stability of prices and eco-
nomic activity over the next several years. Under this policy, a central bank
responds to stock prices, home values, and other asset prices only insofar
as they have implications for future output and inﬂation over the medium
term. Importantly, the strategy eschews any attempt to inﬂuence the spec-
ulative component of asset prices, treating any perceived mispricing as,
rightly or wrongly, an essentially exogenous process. Following this strat-
egy does not imply that policymakers ignore the expected future evolution
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1. David Reifschneider, of the Federal Reserve Board’s staﬀ, contributed substantially to
the preparation of these remarks. The views expressed are my own and not necessarily shared
by my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee.to expand for a time before collapsing—the implications need to be folded
into policy deliberations.
Despite its approach to perceived speculative activity, the conventional
strategy does recognize that monetary policy has an important inﬂuence
on asset prices—indeed, this inﬂuence is at the heart of the transmission of
policy decisions to real activity and inﬂation. It occurs through standard
arbitrage channels, such as the link between interest rates and the discount
factor used to value expected future earnings.
The second strategy, by comparison, is more activist and attempts to
damp speculative activity directly. It was described at length in “Asset Price
Bubbles and Monetary Policy,” an article published by the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) last year. I quote from the article:
This approach amounts to a cautious policy of “leaning against the
wind” of an incipient bubble. The central bank would adopt a somewhat
tighter policy stance in the face of an inﬂating asset market than it would
otherwise allow if confronted with a similar macroeconomic outlook
under more normal market conditions.... It would thus possibly toler-
ate a certain deviation from its price stability objective in the shorter
term in exchange for enhanced prospects of preserving price and eco-
nomic stability in the future. (ECB 2005, 58)
I am labeling this second approach extra action, as it calls for steps that
would not be taken in ordinary circumstances.2
Compared with the ﬁrst approach, the extra-action strategy responds to
a perceived speculative boom with tighter monetary policy—and thus
lower output and inﬂation in the near term—with the expectation of sig-
niﬁcantly mitigating the potential fallout from a possible future bursting of
the bubble. Thus, the strategy seeks to trade oﬀ the near certainty of worse
macroeconomic performance today for the chance of disproportionately
better performance in the future, on the theory that the repercussions of a
major market correction could be highly nonlinear. But the extra-action
proposal is by no means a bold call for central banks to prick market bub-
bles. As the ECB article stresses, such an attempt would be extremely dan-
gerous given the risk that a concerted eﬀort at stamping out a speculative
boom would lead to outsized interest rate hikes and recession. Rather, the
extra-action strategy is intended only to provide some limited insurance
against the possibility of highly adverse events occurring down the road.
I will be talking at length about the diﬀerences between the two strate-
gies, but I must stress up front how much they have in common. Both poli-
cies aim to achieve the same general objectives of monetary policy, using
the same broad analytic framework.
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2. The article’s label for this strategy—leaning against the wind—has been used for many
years to describe the standard behavior of central banks. Given this history, I think that us-
ing the term extra action is less confusing.At the risk of considerable oversimpliﬁcation, policymakers can be de-
scribed as seeking to set policy over time so as to minimize the present
value of future deviations of output from potential and inﬂation from a de-
sired level. Of course, we may not be prepared to write down a speciﬁc loss
function, but our deliberative processes and our actions seem broadly con-
sistent with that characterization of the general problem. This statement is
true whether our institutions have a speciﬁc mandate to keep inﬂation low
and stable and output close to potential, as in the United States, or whether
our mandate is deﬁned primarily in terms of stabilizing prices, as in the
euro area. Stabilizing output complements maintaining price stability in
the medium to long run, and often in the short run as well.
We also can agree that asset prices play critical and complicated roles 
in determining real activity and inﬂation. These roles involve the wealth
eﬀect, the cost of capital, and the relative prices of traded goods, as well as
the value of collateral and thus the provision of credit. In sum, asset prices
inﬂuence the economy in complex and subtle ways over potentially ex-
tended periods of time.
Finally, I think it fair to say that most central banks, faced with only a
limited understanding of asset prices and their interactions with the full
economy, engage in a form of risk management when dealing with market
booms and busts. In part, they do this because any particular policy under
consideration is never associated with a single forecast for the future paths
of output and inﬂation but, instead, with a large set of possible scenarios
with diﬀering odds of coming to pass. Most policymakers engage in at least
an informal weighing of these various possibilities and their implications
when setting policy.
Now let me turn from areas of agreement to more contentious issues. As
I see it, extra action pays only if three tough conditions are met. First, pol-
icymakers must be able to identify bubbles in a timely fashion with reason-
able conﬁdence. Second, there must be a fairly high probability that a mod-
estly tighter policy will help to check the further expansion of speculative
activity. And ﬁnally, the expected improvement in future economic perfor-
mance that would result from a less expansive bubble must be sizable.
For the moment, let me set aside the ﬁrst condition and assume that cen-
tral banks can distinguish an emerging bubble from improving fundamen-
tals at an early stage. Should we presume that a limited application of re-
strictive policy would materially restrain the speculative boom and make
its eventual unwinding less disruptive for the overall economy?
Consider the U.S. stock market boom of the mid-to-late 1990s. The
boom was fueled by a sustained acceleration of productivity and an ac-
companying rise in corporate proﬁts—fundamental changes that justiﬁed
a major rise in equity prices. How high those prices should have risen was
diﬃcult to judge in real time because no one, not investors or central
bankers, could be sure how fast proﬁts would grow in the future. In the
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mentals. But overly optimistic expectations for long-run earnings growth
were not being driven by easy money, and I see no reason to believe that an
extra 50 or even 100 basis points on the funds rate would have had much of
a damping eﬀect on investor beliefs in the potential proﬁtability of emerg-
ing technologies. At present, we just do not have any empirical evidence of
a link between interest rates and corporate equity valuation errors, as op-
posed to standard arbitrage eﬀects.
In general, we have a very poor understanding of the forces driving spec-
ulative bubbles and the role played by monetary policy. In fact, we cannot
rule out perverse eﬀects.3 When the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) tightened in 1999 and early 2000, the trajectory of stock price in-
creases actually steepened, and equity premiums fell—perhaps because in-
vestors became more conﬁdent that good macroeconomic performance
would be sustained. Since mid-2004, we have seen a marked decline in
bond term premiums, even as the funds rate has risen steadily, and U.S.
central bankers have raised questions about the sustainability of low term
premiums. These episodes illustrate that risk premiums often move in mys-
terious ways, and we should not count on the ability of monetary policy to
nudge them in the intended direction.
Perhaps housing markets diﬀer from equity and bond markets. For ex-
ample, homeowners, who may have a less sophisticated understanding of
the economy than professional investors, might mistakenly view a one-
time rise in home prices—resulting, professional investors, a say, from a
decline in interest rates—as evidence of a more persistent upward trend. If
so, a monetary easing directed at stabilizing output and inﬂation might,
conceivably, drive up real estate values by more than fundamentals alone
would merit. Still, you would expect any mispricing from these sources to
be reversed over time as interest rates returned to normal. In any event, em-
pirical evidence on this issue is scanty. Further research into the causal
connections, if any, between policy and bubbles would seem to be needed
before we would know enough to act on such linkages with any conﬁ-
dence.4
However, let us suppose a situation arises in which we are convinced that
tighter policy would check the future expansion of an emerging speculative
bubble. Even then, with the second condition now met, the third condition
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3. From a theoretical standpoint, the “rational bubble” literature demonstrates how a rise
in interest rates might lead rational agents to boost the growth rate of asset prices during a
speculative episode.
4. Recently, ECB staﬀ economists Carsten Detken and Frank Smets have taken a laudable
ﬁrst step at addressing this issue in a paper that establishes some of the basic empirical facts
about the correlations among interest rates, money, credit, asset prices, ﬁnancial distress, and
macroeconomic performance. See Detken and Smets (2004).might not hold: the expected improvement in future macroeconomic per-
formance from moderating the bubble’s expansion may not be enough to
more than oﬀset the upfront costs of extra action. To explain this state-
ment, I note again that extra action with near certainty weakens the econ-
omy and reduces inﬂation before the bubble bursts in exchange for the
chance of better macroeconomic performance in the future.
Admittedly, if the worst-outcome scenario associated with an unchecked
bubble is judged suﬃciently dire and if the scenario is not seen as too im-
probable, then a risk-averse policymaker might regard the expected return
from extra action insurance as worth its upfront cost. However, our conﬁ-
dence in such an assessment would seem to hinge on believing that the
eﬀects of market corrections could be markedly nonlinear. Proponents of
extra action often cite an increased risk of severe ﬁnancial distress as a po-
tential source of such eﬀects. However, without the onset of deﬂation, how
large is this risk? In recent history, the health of the U.S. ﬁnancial system
and those of many other industrial countries remained solid after the col-
lapse of the high-tech boom, despite the bankruptcy of dozens of telecom
and dot-com ﬁrms, the loss of more than $8 trillion in stock market wealth,
and stress in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector.
Of course, the nonlinear risks associated with a collapsing bubble may
depend on the initial health of the ﬁnancial system, and under some cir-
cumstances we could be worried about the potential for signiﬁcant ﬁnan-
cial distress to accompany the bursting of a bubble, should that bubble
expand further. Even in such cases, however, I wonder whether good pru-
dential supervision in advance and prompt action to clean up any linger-
ing structural problems afterward would not be better ways to deal with
this possibility.
I do agree that market corrections can have profoundly adverse conse-
quences if they lead to deﬂation, as illustrated by the United States after the
1929 stock market crash and the more recent experience of Japan. But it
does not follow that conventional monetary policy cannot adequately deal
with the threat of deﬂation by expeditiously mopping up after the bubble
collapses. In Japan, deﬂation could probably have been avoided if the ini-
tial monetary response to the slump in real estate and stock market values
had been more aggressive; in addition, macroeconomic performance
would have been better if the government had dealt more promptly with
the structural problems of the banking sector (Ahearne et al. 2002). As for
the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve actually worsened the situation
by allowing the money supply to contract sharply in 1930 and 1931, after
unwisely attempting to prick the stock market bubble in the ﬁrst place.
Rather than demonstrating the need for preemptive extra action to restrain
emerging bubbles, these examples are object lessons concerning the wis-
dom of central banks’ easing promptly and aggressively following market
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the zero lower bound. By doing so, policymakers should be able to avoid
the severe nonlinear dynamics of deﬂation.
Moreover, we should recognize that under some circumstances extra ac-
tion may exacerbate the problem of deﬂation and the zero bound. If inﬂa-
tion is already low, and a central bank pushes it even closer to zero in trying
to damp an emerging bubble, then extra action may actually increase the
odds of monetary policy becoming constrained by the zero bound when the
bubble eventually bursts. The only way this is not true is if extra action
appreciably moderates the market correction and its expected fallout.
Another purported beneﬁt of extra action is that, by raising the cost of
capital to ﬁrms and households, it helps reduce overinvestment fostered
during speculative booms, thereby making it easier for the economy to re-
cover after the bubble collapses. However, we should be careful not to ex-
aggerate the macroeconomic importance of such capital misallocation.
True, the U.S. high-tech boom led to overinvestment in some sectors, wast-
ing resources and creating lingering diﬃculties while capital overhangs
were eliminated. But it is hard to see much of a cost in terms of diminished
aggregate productivity, given the robust growth of output per hour over the
past few years.
Furthermore, even if tighter monetary policy would have damped the
enthusiasm for dot-com ﬁrms in the late 1990s, higher interest rates would
have also led to less housing and less business investment outside the high-
tech sector, where valuations were not obviously out of line with funda-
mentals. Thus, mitigating capital misallocation in one sector would have
created capital misallocations elsewhere, making the assessment of the net
gain from extra action diﬃcult. And, as I have been pointing out, extra ac-
tion would have idled some capital entirely for a time as economic activity
fell short of its level consistent with stable inﬂation.
Now I would like to return to the ﬁrst condition, the one I sidestepped a
few minutes ago—the question of identifying market bubbles in a timely
fashion. The ECB article stressed that such identiﬁcation is a tricky propo-
sition because not all the fundamental factors driving asset prices are di-
rectly observable, as the productivity acceleration and stock market boom
of the 1990s illustrate. For this reason, any judgment by a central bank that
stocks or homes are overpriced is inherently highly uncertain.
Taking extra action against a rise in asset prices mistakenly identiﬁed as
a bubble has signiﬁcant costs. By acting to mitigate a nonexistent problem,
central banks reduce real economic activity and inﬂation below their de-
sired levels to no purpose. Admittedly, policymakers, once they recognize
their mistake, would presumably want the economy to run hotter for a
time to restore the previous rate of inﬂation and would thereby make up
for the initial output losses. But coming to the realization that the original
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mentals is likely to take some time. And, in the meantime, the mistaken call
will have reduced welfare by needlessly inducing ﬂuctuations in the macro-
economy.
Timing is also an issue. Let us suppose that the evidence is so compelling
that policymakers become fairly conﬁdent that valuations are excessively
rich. Unfortunately, I suspect that this call would often come so late in the
day that, given the lags in the monetary transmission mechanism and un-
certainty about the duration of bubbles, raising interest rates might actu-
ally risk exacerbating instability. The market correction could occur with
policy in a tighter position but before extra action had enough time to ma-
terially inﬂuence speculative activity.
Notwithstanding the controversial aspects of identifying bubbles, poli-
cymakers may still want to warn the public about the possibility of asset
price misalignments when the evidence merits. Such talk might do some
good by prompting investors to stop and rethink their assumptions. And
talk by itself should not do much lasting harm even if valuations turn out
to be justiﬁed—provided, however, that words are not seen as precursors
to action under circumstances in which conventional policy would still be
the best approach.
To wrap up this critique, I summarize as follows: if we can identify bub-
bles quickly and accurately, are reasonably conﬁdent that tighter policy
would materially check their expansion, and believe that severe market cor-
rections have signiﬁcant nonlinear adverse eﬀects on the economy, then ex-
tra action may well be merited. But if even one of these tough conditions is
not met, then extra action would be more likely to lead to worse macro-
economic performance over time than that achievable with conventional
policies that deal expeditiously with the eﬀects of the unwinding of the
bubbles when they occur. For my part, I am dubious that any central
banker knows enough about the economy to overcome these hurdles—at
least at this point.
Proponents of extra action have their own bones to pick with the con-
ventional strategy, especially as it relates to the alleged asymmetric nature
of the policy’s response to asset market booms and busts. In particular, the
claim is often made that, based on the FOMC’s actions over the past
twenty years, the Fed actively works to support the economy in an event of
a sharp decline in asset markets but does little or nothing to restrain mar-
kets when prices are rising, thereby creating moral hazard problems.
This argument strikes me as a misreading of history. United States mon-
etary policy has responded symmetrically to the implications of asset price
movements for actual and projected developments in output and inﬂation,
consistent with its mandate. The most convincing evidence for this state-
ment can be found in the results: interest rates have been consistent with
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companied by relatively mild ﬂuctuations in real activity.5
Conventional policy as practiced by the Federal Reserve has not insu-
lated investors from downside risk. Whatever might have once been
thought about the existence of a “Greenspan put,” stock market investors
could not have endured the experience of the last ﬁve years in the United
States and concluded that they were hedged on the downside by asymmet-
ric monetary policy. Nor, for that matter, should they have concluded that
the Federal Reserve does not act on the upside: If asset prices had been
more closely aligned with fundamentals in the late 1990s, our policy would
almost certainly have been easier, all else equal, because aggregate demand
would have been weaker and, hence, inﬂation pressures even more muted
than they were. The same considerations apply to homeowners: all else be-
ing equal, interest rates are higher now than they would be were real estate
valuations less lofty, and if real estate prices begin to erode, homeowners
should not expect to see all the gains of recent years preserved by mone-
tary policy actions. Our actions will continue to be keyed to macroeco-
nomic stability, not the stability of asset prices themselves.
Ironically, one can argue that extra action may pose a more signiﬁcant
risk of moral hazard. It is one thing for policymakers to raise questions
about the relationship of asset prices to fundamentals and another for a
central bank to take action to inﬂuence valuations in the direction of some
“appropriate” level. How does this strategy play out if a central bank takes
extra action and speculative activity continues unabated or even intensi-
ﬁes? Do policymakers raise rates even further above levels consistent with
conventional policy and, if so, at what consequences for the economy? And
what is the risk that, in taking such steps, a central bank would be seen by
investors as taking on partial responsibility for asset prices? If so, would
the pressure on central banks to support asset prices in market downturns
increase?
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Laurence H. Meyer
This is a topic of very special interest to me as I served on the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) during the period the equity bubble was
building. As the bubble was emerging, I was operating along the lines of
what I have come to call the “indirect approach” to monetary policy, an ap-
proach that Greenspan clearly encouraged at the time and later defended
vigorously and an approach that Ben Bernanke provided intellectual sup-
port for in a paper written before he became a governor and then chairman
of the Fed (Greenspan 2002; Bernanke 2002).
According to the indirect approach, monetary policy should be adjusted
only in response to changes in output gaps or inﬂation—current or pro-
spective—and, therefore, should not directly respond to any other vari-
ables, including equity prices, housing prices, or exchange rates.
I have to admit, however, that the experience with the indirect approach
in the second half of the 1990s did not turn out entirely well, though the
Fed did very eﬀectively execute what Alan Blinder has called the “mopping
up” strategy: being alert to the possibility that a possible asset bubble will
abruptly correct and quickly adjusting policy in the case of a discontinu-
ous adjustment to maintain aggregate demand (Blinder and Reis 2005).
But with the beneﬁt of hindsight, I look back at that experience and
wonder whether monetary policy could have been better managed to miti-
gate the risks to future macroeconomic performance associated with an
emerging equity bubble. I admit that today I still do not know the answer
to that question, but my greatest regret about my time on the FOMC is how
little time we as a committee devoted to thinking about the appropriate
monetary policy response to the suspected equity bubble. So I appreciate
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